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What circumstances trigger a person's duty to tell the truth? Imm anuel Kant claimed without qualification that all circumstances require truthtelling, even when speaking the truth injures the speaker.1 John Henry Cardinal Newman made exceptions for lies that achieved some positive end.2 Hugo Grotius permitted lies to adversaries.3 The philosophy of twentieth-century common sense largely permits white lies. 4 Perhaps surprisingly, some courts have found that Kant's abso lute prohibition of falsehood more accurately characterizes a speaker's duty to tell the truth to the federal government under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 than these other, more relaxed standards.s Accord ing to this view, the prohibition on lying has no less force in infor mal circumstances, in which the speaker swears no oath and the government has no reciprocal duty.6 The statute provides in rele vant part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legis lative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willful l y-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.7
Prosecutors legitimately employ the provision to punish individ uals who supply false information to the government on statutorily required reports.8 Accordingly, the federal judiciary has widely ap plied section 1001 to punish individuals who gave false statements to the General Services Administration,9 the Customs Service,10 the FBI,11 and state unemployment agencies.12
Courts have been reluctant, however, to apply the statute to cer tain kinds of false statements given in the context of criminal inves tigations.13 This reluctance may stem from the fear that prosecutors might use the provision improperly: authorities unable to prove the elements of a substantive crime could induce a suspect to spout falsehoods in order to charge him with a section 1001 violation,14 or they could encourage repetition of false responses in order to charge multiple statutory violations. 15 These kinds of concerns prompted one court to create the exculpatory no exception to sec tion 1001. 16 The exculpatory no exception shields from section 1001 liability an interrogee's denial of involvement in, or knowledge of, criminal activity.17 As the name implies, protected responses must have two general characteristics: (i) they must be exculpatory; and (ii) they must be limited to words of denial containing no discursive misrepresentations. 18 Courts deem a response exculpatory if it conveys false informa tion in a situation in which a truthful reply would have incriminated 8. 31 U.S.C. § 5316, for example, requires travelers who cross U.S. borders with more than $10,000 in cash to file a report. Section 1001 punishes falsifying reports of this kind.
See, e.g., United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1983 ." 1 9 The following sce nario represents a clear case of an answer that would itself support a conviction: an FBI agent asks a suspect who had received illegal income whether he had done so, and the suspect denies receiving the illegal income.2 0 Similarly, truthfully admitting receipt of an original tax refund check would not directly incriminate a defend ant, but would furnish a link in the chain of evidence necessary to convict her of fraudulently seeking a replacement check for the original that she claimed never to have received.2 1 A false denial in these circumstances would therefore be exculpatory.22 On the other hand, had an agent asked whether the sky were blue, and had the suspect denied it, the response would not have qualified for the exception because, presumably, a truthful answer would not have been incriminating,2 3 and the denial, therefore, would not have been exculpatory.2 4
The second characteristic of protected responses is their limita tion to words of denial. Although there is less unanimity on this issue than on the definition of exculpatory,2 5 this Note initially adopts a broad definition reflective of the majority position.2 6 A denial is a simple statement of negation with regard to involvement in, or knowledge of, criminal activity. 23. The danger of incrimination must be "real and appreciable" and not "imaginary and unsubstantial." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
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Cf., e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978 ) (holding that the defend ant's truthful answer to a customs agent's routine questions would not have incriminated him and that he therefore did not qualify for the exception). Following the original articulation of the exculpatory no excep tion in 1955,32 the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted it.33 Yet despite the exception's forty-two-year pedigree, the Second and Fifth Circuits have in re cent years either overturned or ignored their own precedent and have rejected the exception.34 These two circuits each justify their about-face on the same two bases. First, they deny that the stat ute's plain wording, even when augmented by the legislative his tory, authorizes an exception for mere exculpatory denials35 -the "Plain Language Objection." Second, they reject the idea that re spect for the values underlying the Fifth Amendment requires af firming the exculpatory no exception -the "Values Objection."36
This Note contends that the Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari,37 should recognize the continued validity of the exculpa tory no exception. To reflect more closely the concerns that justify the exception, the Court should also reformulate the varied tests lower courts have employed to determine whether a defendant may invoke the exception.38 Part I asserts that Congress had no inten tion of criminalizing mere exculpatory denials, and that the excep tion is thus completely consistent with the purposes of the false statement statute. Part II argues that punishing exculpatory denials may threaten the privilege against self-incrimination. This Part 29. More discursive responses that are statements of negation but do not contain affirm a tive misrepresentations present borderline cases. They may also qualify for the exception.
See infra Part IV (setting out the contours of the test for the exception). contends, however, that the Supreme Court can avoid an unneces sary constitutional determination of this issue by upholding the ex ception. Part ill argues that the exculpatory no exception protects certain principles of fairness that also underlie the Constitution, and that, absent congressional intent to the contrary, respect for these principles requires recognition of the exception in interpreting sec tion 1001. Part IV urges adoption of a streamlined version of the tests courts have used to determine the exception's applicability, a version that more clearly captures the fairness concerns articulated in Part ill and the legislative intent noted in Part I.
I: THE PuRPosE OF THE FALSE STATEMENT STATUTE
This Part argues that in enacting section 1001, Congress evinced no intention to criminalize simple false denials when an interrogee offers them to exculpate himself in the context of a criminal investi gation. Section I. A contends that the exception is consistent with the limited statutory scope and purposes described in the legislative history. 39 It also refutes the Second and Fifth Circuits' claims that the statutory history prohibits courts' use of the exception. Section I.B counters the Second and Fifth Circuits' Plain Language objection.
A. Congressional In tent and the Fa lse Statement Statute
The exculpatory no exception is consistent with the two pur poses of the false statement statute: to protect the government from certain deceptive practices by contractors, and to protect the government from relying on false information that interferes with its functions. As to the first purpose, nondiscursive exculpatory de nials are simply not the types of practices against which the statute us to make an investigation and prosecute persons who are engaged in the "kick-back" practice. They make false returns, claiming that they paid certain amounts to their employees, when they have not done so. This bill just amends the law so as to give the Federal Govern ment authority to deal with that class of cases. 43 A simple denial of culpability in the face of incriminating question ing -at least in situations in which the speaker did not seek a government contract -would not even implicate "that class of cases," much less frustrate Congress's purpose in enacting the statute.
The exculpatory no exception is also reasonably consistent with the statute's second purpose: to prohibit perversion of, or interfer ence with, the legitimate functions of government by, for example, inducing action or reliance.44 Because exculpatory denials are re sponses to questioning, suspects issue them most often during an investigation. In a formulation reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations,45 an investigator's function is "to determine whether sufficient evidence exists for a person to be charged with a crime."46 Failure to admit wrongdoing is just a part of that evidence; it is not Congress amended the statute, it sought to extend the statute's ap plication to a broader class of statements.ss According to these courts, the exception is inconsistent with this alleged intent toward progressively broader application.s6
Even if one were to accept the tenuous proposition that courts can deduce a univocal congressional intent from examining amend ments made periodically over the seventy years prior to enactment of the statute's current language, it lends no support to the Second and Fifth Circuits' argument. In fact, the Supreme Court's review of the statute's evolution actually supports the opposite conclusion: that no Congress intended to criminalize false denials.s7 Tracing the course of amendments through time is illustrative. The original false statement statute enacted in 1863, for example, reached only military officers and others who made false statements to the gov ernment "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of [a false] claim .... "s s Although subse quent Congresses through 1918 codified and recodified the statute and changed the penalties, these successive amendments to the original statute did not broaden section 1001 's basic character as the Second and Fifth Circuits claim. Rather, the statute's basic charac ter throughout the period consistently required a purpose to bilk the government out of money or property.s9 Exculpatory denials generally do not have such a purpose, 60 so through 1918, at least, Congress apparently did not intend to criminalize them.61 The sub sequent substantive amendment in 1934 that enacted the present language, of course, did broaden the statute's reach, 62 but if the 1934 Congress had intended to change the statute's applicability to simple exculpatory denials, its legislative history ought to reflect In its second alternative historical reading, the Fifth Circuit con tends that the intent of Congresses more recent than the one that enacted the current language ought to help guide statutory inter pretation. 67 The court argues that Congress's failure to codify the exculpatory no exception in subsequent years68 reflects tacit con gressional disapproval of the exception.69 This argument may be dismissed on two grounds. First, as a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has generally condemned the use of subsequent Congressional conduct to help guide statutory interpretation.7 0 Second, Congress's 1996 reenactment of section 1001 implicitly approved the exception. The 1996 Act restructured the statute's format but did not change the wording of the principal clauses. It also slightly altered the jurisdictional language to make clear that the statute applied to certain false statements given before the legis lature and judiciary, as well as those made to the executive branch.71 These changes merely reflected congressional concern Hu bbard. "74 At the time of Hu bbard, only the Fifth Circuit had rejected the exception;7s seven circuits approved of it.76 In this con text, the legislative history and the fact of reenactment itself appear to approve the prior limit on section 1001's breadth that the excep tion then imposed.77 Both this contemporary evidence and the evi dence that the 1934 amendment provides indicate that the exculpatory no exception is a valid construction of section 1001.
B. The Plain Language Objection
Courts that reject the exception argue that it has no foundation in the statute's "plain language."78 This Plain Language Objection is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the statutory 'language is sim ply not as plain as these circuits claim. Second, courts -including the Second and Fifth Circuits -regularly permit judicial glosses on the same or similar statutes without explicit authorization in the language.79 Thus, the fact that the exculpatory no exception is a gloss on the language is not sufficient reason to reject it.
The language of section 1001 is neither plain nor simple: at sev eral points it exhibits ambiguities that courts must resolve -and lacunae that courts must fill -by going beyond the text. The statutory term "false" is also not as plain as it might appear initially. Certain declarations, such as excited utterances, can be neither true nor false. A "no" may be an exclamation or "excited utterance,"93 if the accusative questioning is sufficiently startling, unexpected, or intense.94 If the investigator, for example, browbeat and provoked a suspect to such an extent that the suspect angrily snapped "no" to get the investigator off his back, such a denial may be neither true nor false.95 In fact, it may not even be a "state ment" because of its nonassertive nature. As this section indicates, Congress's intent for meanings of the terms "willful l y," "false," and "statement" is simply not so plain as the Second and Fifth Circuits have claimed.96
Even if the plain language had unambiguously authorized appli cation of the statute to any utterance arguably deserving of the la bel "false" in any setting whatsoever, it is simply untrue that courts do not go beyond the plain language in making their decisions.97 In fact, broad statutory language may represent a delegation of power from Congress to the courts. Thus, broad language may not require broad application, but may instead represent a license to create fed eral common law. The same logic justifies restricting the scope of section 1001. The strictest reading of the plain language, after all , could yield an interpretation that encompassed just about any statement in any circumstance whatsoever.102 Nevertheless, every court, including the Second and Fifth Circuits, has limited the broad reading in some fashion. Indeed, the circuits' limitations on section 1001 have no more support from the plain language or legislative history than the exculpatory no exception.1 0 3 This inconsistency demonstrates that the Second and Fifth Circuits object not to narrowing the statu tory scope that section 100l's plain language dictates, but to the method of the narrowing. If the Plain Language Objection were viable, it would 'also preclude the interpretations these circuits ac cept. The objection is therefore merely an interpretive make weight.
In sum, this Part has demonstrated that the exculpatory no ex ception is a valid construction of the false statement statute because it is consistent with the statute's two purposes. Moreover, the Plain Language Objection is insufficient to cast doubt on the exception's validity. 103. Notwithstanding their Plain Language Objection, these circuits implicitly accepted two extratextual judicial glosses on the statute's then·existing plain language that are indistin guishable on a principled basis from the exculpatory no exception. Strictly speaking, the phrase "knowingly and willful l y, " for example, modified only "falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The other two phrases -regarding false statements and false writings -were unmodified, suggesting that no culpability requirement applies to them. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did require that each of the types of conduct be done "knowingly and willful l y." See United States v.
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F. 3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit explicitly noted that this requirement was only one of the safeguards "embodied " in -rather than evident from a strict reading of the plain language of -the statute. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996) .
Similarly, application of the "materiality " requirement to all three types of conduct in the pre-1996 version of the statute is also a judicial construction, a "judge-made limitation, " see 
II. COERCION, CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, AND THE v ALUES OBJECTION
The exculpatory no exception permits the Supreme Court to avoid deciding whether applying the federal false statement statute to mere exculpatory denials violates the privilege against self incrimination.104 When a statutory construction obviates the need for a constitutional decision, and that construction does not frus trate congressional intent,105 the Court's precedent requires it to ac cept the construction and refuse to reach the constitutional question.1°6 The relevance of the Self-Incrimination Clause107 has been the subject of significant conflict among the courts.108 In re sponse to the Second and Fifth Circuits' Values Objection, which holds the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to the prosecution of ex culpatory denials under the federal false statement statute,109 this Part sketches the prima facie argument, elaborated at length else where,110 that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause does implicitly prohibit punishing simple exculpatory denials.111
Specifically, it argues that punishing exculpatory denials creates for the interrogee a coercive "cruel trilemma"11 2 that is analogous to that faced by a courtroom witness absent the protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.113 The Part goes on to argue that the exculpatory no exception is a statutory construction that permits the Court to avoid having to resolve whether the Self-Incrimination 
The options open to a suspect of federal agents are quite compa rable to those options the Court has ruled unacceptable for a court room witness under the Self-Incrimination Clause. 114 Without the Fifth Amendment's protections, the courtroom witness would fa ce prosecution for perjury fo r a lie, contempt for silence, or conviction for an incriminating admission. This scenario creates a "cruel trilemma"1 1 s and is constitutionally prohibited. 116 Similarly, with out the exculpatory no exception's protection, the suspect would have to choose from a fa lse denial, a self-incriminating truth, or si lence -each of which entails adverse consequences. He could confess his wrongdoing, which could result in conviction on the ba sis of the confession. He could deny the conduct, so that a court might subsequently convict him of a fa lse statement. Or the inter rogee could attempt to remain silent. 11 7 Aside from the fact that silence may not be a practical option because the interrogee may be unaware of his right to silence,1 18 or because "communicative reali ties" prohibit silence and require some answer,1 19 federal prosecu tors may subsequently use silence as evidence to convict the interrogee. 120 In each of these cases, a defendant "will have been convicted by his own words [ In rejecting the exculpatory no exception, the Second and Frft h Circuits argued that the Fifth Amendment provides a right to si lence rather than a right to lie,123 and therefore does not protect false denials.124 The argument has three flaws. First, the Supreme Court case that the circuit courts quote simply does not involve a challenge under the Self-Incrimination Clause and is therefore in apposite.125 Second, the argument assumes that the interrogee in an informal interview perceives silence as an option that is open to him; in fact, many times it is not.126 A suspect's refusal to answer on the grounds that it may incriminate him, for example, prompts the unmistakable inference that the suspect is guilty of a cri me re lated to the question asked and is, therefore, as inculpatory as an admission.121 In this situation, silence would be the functional equivalent of an admission because it had the same effect.128 Fur thermore, in contrast to a fo rmal interview preceded by oaths, Miranda warnings, transcripts, and other trappings of formality that indicate a setting in which it is appropriate for the interrogee to invoke legal rights, the informal interview provides no such cues.129
The third flaw in the Second and Fifth Circuits' focus on the "right to silence" is that their analysis is incomplete -it does not exhaust the content of the Fifth Amendment. the line of Fifth Amendment cases that emphasize the word "com pelled" rather than the "right to silence."131 Under this line of cases, the Self-Incrimination Clause protects individuals from im proper methods of interrogation.13 2 From this perspective, it makes no difference whether "no" is a statement, or whether the response is a lie, or a truth, or silence.133 The response, in effect, is not im portant. What matters is whether the method of interrogation amounted to governmental compulsion.134 Mere exculpatory deni als should not be punished under section 1001 because they prevent cruel trilemmas that compel self-incrimination.13 s When a given application of a statue would "raise serious consti tutional problems,"136 courts should seek a construction that avoids the constitutional issue, unless Congress expressly intended to con front it.13 7 In the case of the false statement statute, Congress showed no such express intent.138 The Court therefore should ap- 
ill . PROTECTING INTERESTS IN FAIRNESS AND
THE v ALUES OBJECTION Beginnin g from the assumption that courts ought to139 -and often do140 --construe the law against a moral background of fair ness and equity, this Part contends that the Supreme Court, in keeping with its decisions regarding its supervisory power over criminal law enforcement,141 should retain the exculpatory no ex ception because it protects fairness. It should do so not on constitu tional grounds, but because "courts' whole approach to nonconstitutional review is properly informed by conceptions of le gitimate public purpose that underlie substantive constitutional scrutiny."142 Absent congressional intent to the contrary,143 the Court may assume that Congress legislated against the background of such "conceptions of legitimate public purpose" as ensuring fair o Each section then identifies the· legal analogue suggesting that a particular defined value underlies the terms of the Constitution. Without addressing the merits of the fairness claims, which are treated at length in the cited sources, these sections instead sketch how the exculpatory no exception vindicates these fairness interests. It also asserts that the parallels between the fairness interests protected by the Constitu tion and those protected by the exception ought to militate in favor of sustaining the exception.
A. Fa irness as Procedural Proportionality
In the section 1001 context, the principle of procedural propor tionality1 5 1 requires courts to balance the public's interest in the or derly functioning of government against the individual's interest in freedom from government interference.1 52 A constitutional ana logue lies in the Court's search and seizure decisions requiring some parity between the government's needs and the extent of its inva sion.1 5 3 Similarly, if the government is unlikely to rely on the an swer to an incriminating question, its need for a truthful reply may diminish relative to the interrogee's right to be let alone.1 5 4 The 151. See Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 41 (arguing that, with the exception of very seri ous crimes like murder, police should generally leave potential suspects alone unless the po· lice have a substantial basis for suspicion). Implicitly, Greenawalt is contending that the harm done must justify the invasion of the right to be left alone. 153. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (holding that the quan tum of probable cause required for issuance of an inspection warrant must be determined in part by the reasonableness of the search: reasonableness requires "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails").
154. In theory, for example, the public is less apt to feel resentment in situations in which there is no harm. See Michael S. Moore, Th e Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 237, 267 (1994). Where the public feels no resentment, there is arguably less of a likelihood that the public will want to authori ze such government intru· sions. See id. at 268.
Department of Justice app ears to concede this view.155
In such a case, therefore, permitting a minimally harmful156 exculpatory de nial that frees an interrogee from his coercive predicament seems to strike an appropriate balance.157 The exception helps ensure that the government's investigation is procedurally proportional by cre ating a zone of noninterference where governmental interests are minimal, much as the privilege against self-incrimination secures a preserve against government intrusion.
B. Fa irness As Human Dignity
Application of the false statement statute to simple exculpatory denials can violate the principle of fairness as human dignity by making an individual the instrument of his own destruction.158 A violation of this principle is a particularized form of governmental interference for which the Supreme Court has previously shown concern through its solicitude, in the context of the Fifth Amend ment, for "the inviolability of the human personality."159 Issuing an exculpatory denial can be an assertion of human dignity, an "affir mation of self in the face of the state "16 0 similar to the ethical basis for the requirements of various provisions of the Bill of Rights,161 because it serves the function of self-preservation. Morally, there is intrinsic value in giving the accused the capacity to defend himself with an exculpatory denial rather than having the government look after his liberty . 16 2 This fairness interest also accords with common intuition. Com mentators argue, for example, that self-preservation is -at best a laudable instinct163 and, even at worst, an understandable one. The squeamishness about punishing the instinct, for example, may 155. Cf. 9 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANuAL, supra note 48, § 9-42.160 (stating policy "that it is not appropriate to charge a Section 1001 violation where a suspect, during an investigation, merely denies his guilt"). Such a policy implies that obtaining the truth from the suspect in these limited circumstances is not so valuable to the government that it out weighs other concerns. be a "There-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I" empathy.164 Each of us is unsure that he would act diff erently if faced with the situation, and fairness thus requires that society not hold particular individu als to norms more strict than its individual members believe they can meet.165
C. Fa irness as Fa ir Play
By providing the suspect with the safe harbor of an exculpatory denial, the exception helps to level the playing field between a rela tively weak criminal suspect and a powerful government together engaged in an adversarial contest.166 The Court's decisions in Mi randa v. Arizona167 and other cases16 8 reflect one constitutional an alogue of this type of fairness. Instead of permitting the already strong state to exploit the suspect by compelling him to incriminate himself, the Self-Incrimination Clause forces the state to "maintain a 'fair state-individual balance' "169 and to "'shoulder the entire load' "170 of proving that individual guilty.1 1 1 A second analogue is the Supreme Court's due process vagueness doctrine that aims in part at "eliminating laws that invite [government] manipulation."1 7 2 Similarly, the exculpatory no exception discourages the government not only from enlisting the suspect in his own destruction, but also from engaging in misconduct involving the very real danger of 166. See generally GRANO, supra note 148, at 28-32 (describing the similar "fox-hunter's argument" that even a guilty defendant deserves a sporting chance to prevent his trial from becoming a meaningless exercise and to encourage the government to conduct a thorough investigation). abuse of section 1001.173 Such abuse might take the form, for ex ample, of the government's asking questions to which it already knows the answer in order to invite repetition of what it knows to be false statements for the purpose of multiplying the counts.114 Even absent the abuse, the exculpatory denial may help to ensure fair play between investigator and suspect: it offers a suspect a lim ited exception from his duty of truthtelling in a situation in which the government agent has no equivalent duty . 11 s
D. Fa irness as Notice
The exculpatory no exception protects individuals who had no notice176 that a false denial of guilt is legally wrong.117 The Supreme Court has held that due process requires notice to poten tial wrongdoers when ordinary conduct constitutes criminal behav ior.178 Without such protection, the government could punish a 177. For example, many government forms and declarations -including tax returnsinclude warnings above the signature line that falsehoods are punishable as perjury. A rea sonable but uninformed citizen may infer that absent such a warning, falsehoods are not punishable -in other words, that it is the breaking of an oath, and not the failure to tell the truth, that warrants punishment. Cf. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975 ) (noting the informality of the questioning, including the lack of an oath, as a factor that induced the court to declare the denials in question to be "clear" exculpatory no's). person who lacked opportunity to conform his conduct to the re quirements of the law. 1 79
Notice is particularly important when the ordinary conduct pro hibited falls on the moral boundary line between what is socially desirable or tolerated 1 8 0 and what is socially undesirable,1 8 1 Self protective denials in the face of government interrogation are in stances of such morally ambiguous acts. 1 82 The ambiguity of these denials stems from the clash of two moral imperatives: first, not to lie; and second, to protect oneself from an adversary. While the first imperative is strong in the Western tradition, 1 8 3 it is not abso lute. 184 Indeed, this imperative is qualified by the common moral intuition that one has no duty to tell the truth to an adversary, 1 8 5 because neither side expects truth from the other. 1 8 6 In an interro gation, the government has opened an adversarial relationship1 8 7 and has consequently relaxed the moral imperative not to lie.1 8 8
In such cases of moral ambiguity, fair notice requires actual knowledge that the conduct is wrong, 1 89 and the Court will there- 180. Cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (construing a criminal statute that punished unauthor ized transfer of food stamps to have a "knowledge-of-illegality requirement" to avoid punish ing "apparently innocent conduct"). For a similar distinction, see also Kahan, supra note 176, at 148 (noting the difference between withholding punishment for conduct and approval of that conduct).
181. See Kahan, supra note 176, at 150-51. Professor Kahan notes that in such mere ma /um prohibitum crimes, particularly those involving ordinary conduct, see supra notes 164-65 (describing society's discomfort in holding others to a standard, under criminal law, that is higher than the average person could expect to meet), a defense of mistake of law may be available; he contrasts this to ma/um in se crimes, in which no mistake-of-law defense is available because behavior at the margins of legality indicates the bad character society wants to punish.
182.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (detailing ambiguity of the scope of one's duty to tell the truth). In sum, construing section 1001 to include the exculpatory no exception reflects the reasonable assumption that Congress legis lated with an eye to fairness. Absent indication of congressional intent inconsistent with this assumption, the Supreme Court should adopt the exception.
IV. C ONTOURS OF THE T EST TO D ETERMINE W HETHER A S USPECT M AY lNv OKE THE E XCULPATORY
No E xcEPTION 1bis Part examines the circumstances necessary for a defendant to invoke the exculpatory no exception. While courts have used a variety of complex tests,192 this Part proposes a simple three-factor test that more accurately comports with the purposes of the statute and the philosophical justifications of the exception than the multi ple factors used by courts in the past. The three factors are as fol lows: (i) the false statement must be a mere denial; (ii) the false statement must not have perverted the basic functions of the agency; and (iii ) the suspect must reasonably have believed that a truthful answer would have been incriminating. Section IV.A de fends the three factors in light of congressional purpose and philo sophical justifications. Section N.B rejects, on the same grounds, other factors used by various courts.
A. Conditions Required to In voke the Exception
A defendant should be able to invoke the exception only in situ ations in which he responds to an agent's incriminating question with a simple denial that containing neither aggressive elaboration nor discursive falsehood.193 1bis requirement most closely reflects the conception of "No" as an exclamatory or performative utter ance that is neither true nor false, and, hence, not within the plain One might argue, of course, that any exculpatory effort, whether discursive or nondiscursive, could reflect a self-preserving quest for fairness as human dignity. This argument may appear to have par ticular force in situations in which, for example, a government agent refuses to accept or credit a simple denial and browbeats the inter rogee into providing more detail. In fact, however, it also seems reasonable to expect that such browbeating would trigger the sus pect to ask for the protection of counsel or for permission to leave the interview.196 Even if it did not, a discursive exculpatory state ment is likely to induce action or reliance on the part of govern ment investigators. Such reliance -unlikely in the case of a mere denial197 -would arguably significantly pervert the investigator's function.198 Because Congress's intent in enacting the false state ment statute was to prevent interference with legitimate govern ment functions,199 such a statement would more clearly cause the harm Congress intended to prevent. Thus, in a procedural propor tionality analysis, the difference between a simple denial and a dis cursive statement may mark the point at which the government interest outweighs the suspect's interest in human dignity . 200
Furthermore, a simple denial seems better evidence that self preservation motivated the suspect.2 01 More elaborate statements, on the other hand, suggest premeditated, nefarious and "willfu l" motives such as interference with agency function2 02 or the deflec- To satisfy the third requirement for invoking the exception, the suspect must demonstrate that he reasonably believed he would have incriminated himself had he given a truthful answer to the agent's question. The standard should be "reasonable belief' rather than "actual danger" because fair play requires that the courts minimize the potential for government aouse.20 8 A suspect who reasonably believes himself to be in danger of incriminating himself is as likely to be ripe for government overreaching as one is aware of an actual danger of self-incrimination. Giving the suspect a tool -the false denial -reduces the level of compulsion present in noncustodial interrogations so that the suspect is less vulnerable in either case. Similarly, without a legal false denial, a suspect com promises his human dignity not only when a truthful answer would have incriminated him, but also when he believes that the answer would have had this effect. 209 In either case, it is the belief that he [Vol. 96:754 is participating in his own destruction that constitutes the spectacle of unfairness and cruelty.2 10
B. Conditions No t Required to In voke th e Exception
In addition to the factors mentioned in section IV.A, courts have considered additional factors. This section argues that three of these factors should not be part of the test for invoking the ex ception because they do not lend themselves to administrative sim plicity, let alone comport with congressional intent or the exception's philosophical underpinni ngs. These three requirements are: (i) that the statement be unrelated to a claim or privilege;211
(ii) that the defendant have been a suspect in the investigation dur ing which he delivers the false exculpatory denial;2 1 2 and (iii ) that the interrogee have issued the false denial in the course of an inves tigation, rather than during a routine administrative matter.213
The first requirement simply bears no sufficient relation to Con gress's intent to prohibit statements that pervert the functioning of the government. Under this requirement a defendant who issued an exculpatory denial while seeking, for example, a government ap pointment, entry into the United States, or a government contract, would not be eligible for the exception.214 While a "claim" or "privilege" does suggest that important government functions are at stake, the requirement is both under-and overinclusive. A suspect may be making a claim yet may not pervert agency functions; on the other hand, the suspect may not be making a claim but still inter fere with the functioning of government.21 s 210. Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301 {1980) (holding that in defining whether questioning is interrogation, courts should "focus[] primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police"). {defendant's fraudulent attempt to obtain replacement U.S. Tr easury check for one she had already received and cashed not characterized as claim against the government).
Enforcing the second requirement would inadequately protect fairness. It may exclude from protection nonsuspects to whom in criminating questions are posed.216 There is no reason to think that nonsuspects would be invulnerable to the same kinds of unfairness; after all, the government can put even a nonsuspect into a position where he can incriminate himself.217 In fact, one circuit restricts the exception to those who are unaware of being a suspect, reasoning that a nonsuspect is more vulnerable because his silence might alert the investigator to his guilt.218 Accordingly, to protect fairness ade quately, both suspects and nonsuspects ought to be able to invoke the exception.
The third requirement, that the suspect have issued the false de nial in the course of an investigation -as opposed to during a rou tine administrative matter -is duplicative: a belief in the potential for self-incrimination usually only arises in the course of an investi gation.219 It has been argued that this distinction separates the po tentially unfair investigatory situation entailing possible criminal sanctions,220 from the presumably fair administrative situation, that has no such consequences.221 In practice, however, courts have not uniformly applied the distinction,222 and the Eleventh Circuit has deemed it unworkable.223 Thus, the inquiry as to whether a truthful response would have been incriminating, a test that does not entail these complications, better captures the intent of the distinction. 220. See Gerstein, supra note 119, at 354 ("While the moral autonomy of the individual is compromised whenever the state compels an admission of wrongdoing, the wrong is clearest and gravest when the state compels the admission as part of the process by which it seeks to establish a defendant's guilt in a legally definitive manner."). 
